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have as
one of its purposes the mitigation of the balance of payments
burden falling on us as a result of stationing our forces in Germany.
The earlier such arrangements could be made, the sooner we could hope to
see results, but transitional arrangements would also be necessary for
some years. Long-term arrangements were likely to be more advantageous
to us in view of the German need to re-equip their forces over the next
five years.
This would give us an opportunity to take the place of the Americans as the main suppliers to the German forces. In the present
German budgetary and political situation a short-term offset agreement
would almost certainly, result in a less satisfactory deal than we had negotiated for the current year. Our Ambassador in Bom (Sir Frank Roberts)
should be instructed to approach the Germans in the near future, although
it appeared that it would not be possible to start substantive
negotiations until October or November, Sir Frank Roberts would have an
opportunity of a preliminary discussion with the Federal German Foreign
Minister, Herr Brandt, in the second week of August.
In discussion the view was expressed that the prospect of securing
adequate cover for the foreign exchange cost of our forces in Germany
next year was not hopeful, while it remained essential to reduce the
drain on the balance of payments, especially since the closure of the
Suez Canal was placing serious foreign exchange burdens upon the economy.
Nevertheless the gross foreign exchange saving of £5 million a year from
the redeployment of a second brigade must be set against the additional
budgetary expenditure of about £20 million required to accommodate it in
the United Kingdom and provide it with the necessary training facilities
including a new tracked training area in the north of England. Further consideration might be given to achieving savings in foreign exchange
by reducing the level of war reserves held in Germany. The current German difficulties on defence expenditure ruled out any prospect of
obtaining from them firm commitments on offset by October, but it was
important that we should now stake our claim in order that the Federal
German Government could take account of our requirements before deciding on their budget. It was suggested that action on our part such as
preparations to accommodate further troops from Germany might be
necessary to convince the Germans of the seriousness with which we
regarded the offset problem; but it was the general view that in present circumstances any suggestion that we were contemplating further redeployments could well have the effect of encouraging the Germans to reduce their own force commitments and put the position of NATO at risk.
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